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     * The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.  
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 05-3784
                    
ROBERTO RUIZ,
                                      Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-03575
District Judge:  The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 27, 2006
                    
Before: BARRY, VAN ANTWERPEN and SILER,* Circuit Judges 
                   
(Opinion Filed: June 27, 2006)
                    
OPINION
                    
2BARRY, Circuit Judge
Roberto Ruiz applied for Social Security disability benefits in 1999.  He suffered
from conditions including a disc bulge, hypertrophic changes, and blindness in one eye. 
After several rounds of proceedings and internal appeals, the Appeals Council of the
Social Security Administration (the “agency”) upheld a decision of an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) that these conditions did not render Ruiz disabled.  Ruiz filed suit in
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on July 25, 2002, claiming
that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.  The District Court affirmed
in an order entered on April 27, 2004.  Ruiz appealed.  While the case was pending before
us, on July 29, 2004, a different ALJ awarded Ruiz full disability benefits based on a
finding of mental retardation.  Because this finding affected Ruiz’s eligibility for benefits
retroactively, he and the government submitted a joint motion to us
for an Order remanding the within cause of action to the district court, for
the purpose of remanding the case to the Appellee pursuant to sentence four
(4) of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for the purpose of issuing a fully favorable
decision pursuant to the attached form of order.
We granted that motion on November 16, 2004.  The District Court remanded the case to
the agency on June 15, 2005.
Ruiz filed an application in the District Court on December 1, 2004, pursuant to
the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).  Under the EAJA, the “prevailing party” in a
civil action against the United States is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and other
costs, “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
3justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”  28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(A).  The government replied that Ruiz’s motion was premature, that the
agency’s position had been substantially justified, and that special circumstances existed
because Ruiz’s entitlement to benefits was not connected to the agency’s decision in the
case at bar.
Instead of addressing these arguments, the District Court sua sponte asked whether
Ruiz was a “prevailing party.”  In Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991), the
Supreme Court identified two forms of remand from a district court to the agency.  The
first, pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), consists of “a judgment
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [agency], with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing.”  The second, pursuant to the sixth sentence of §
405(g), consists of a remand for the taking of new material evidence when “there is good
cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” 
While these forms of remand under § 405(g) differ in when they become final, both may
lead to an award of EAJA fees.  Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 102.  A district court may also
enter a voluntary dismissal on the stipulation of the parties pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(a), in which case no EAJA fee award is appropriate, as there is no
prevailing party.  Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 102-03.  The District Court here concluded that
our Order should be “construed as a voluntary dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)” and
     1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review do novo any legal
determinations underlying an award or denial of fees.  Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d
542, 545 (3d Cir. 2001).
4
denied attorney’s fees on that basis on June 28, 2005.  Ruiz appealed.1
The motion we granted by order dated November 16, 2004 specified
unambiguously that the remand was “for the purpose of remanding the case to the
Appellee pursuant to sentence four (4) of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).”  (emphasis added) 
Accordingly, this was not a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a), and Ruiz was thus a
“prevailing party” for purposes of EAJA fees.  See Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 103.  The
District Court should not have “construed” our order granting a motion that was clear on
its face.
We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand so that it may
consider whether the agency’s litigation position was substantially justified or whether
special circumstances would make an award of fees unjust. 
